REVIEW OFLA WAND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol.21:1 hibit significantly greater negative emotional reactivity to being placed in 14 - restraints. Similarly, rape survivors report experiencing profound negative emotional reactions to being physically controlled. Anecdotal case studies report that restraints can dredge up repressed memories of physical and sexual abuse.16 This list is hardly comprehensive, as the psychological implications of restraints have been discussed for well over two centuries.
Beyond the potentially serious consequences of mechanical restraints, a second cause of controversy is the lack of uniformity in their application and use. The frequency with which restraints are used is highly variable. One study found that 51% of all patients were restrained at least once during their hospitalization,' 8 whereas others report lower rates, 19 . Individuals with PTSD scored higher than non PTSD individuals on self-report measures of trauma, indicating they felt less safe, more fearful, more helpless, and more distressed while in restraints. Id. at 1127. 1s See Freunch et al., supra note 14, at 1127 (patients with a history of sexual assault were more likely to report medication being used as a threat or coercive device, inadequate privacy, unwanted sexual advances, and sexual assault by staff members).
16 See generally Sharyl Smith, Restraints: Retraumatization Jbr Rape Victims, 23 J. PSYCHOL. NURSING 23, 23 (1995) (finding, on the basis of several case studies, that rape survivors described the experience of restraints as evoking feelings of helplessness similar to those feelings experienced during sexual assault).
17 Phillippe Pinel, considered the godfather of psychiatry, discussed the use of restraints in 1794: "'[Servants] carry [the madman] to his cell while thwarting his efforts and chain him if he is very dangerous or merely lock him up."' Fisher, supra note 12, at 1584. Even in 1880, the deleterious effects of restraints were known and discussed. Walter Channing, The Use of Mechanical 20 The duration of time spent in restraints is also variable, ranging anywhere from minutes to upwards of days.21 The reasons prompting the use of restraints are similarly variable. For example, the actual occurrence of violence tends not to be the most common motivation for the use of restraints.22 Instead, threats of violence tend to occasion restraints far more often,23 suggesting that restraints are not generally used to contain ongoing violence.24 Less pernicious reasons such as disorientation, agitation, or refusal to follow staff instructions also commonly motivate the use of re-25 straints. 400-02 (2002) ; but see Way & Banks, supra note 20, at 386 (finding that assault on staff was the most common motivation for the use of restraints).
23 El-Bardi & Mellsop, supra note 22, at 400-02; Phillips & Nasr, supra note 18, at 230;
Telintelo, supra note 19, at 164-65 (reporting that behaviors indicative of violence were the most common percipient of restraints).
A number of studies have examined the correlates of restraint use.26 These studies, as a whole, suggest that neither clinical nor demographic variables are consistently related to the use of restraints. Some studies find that age is related to the use of restraints, with younger patients restrained more frequently,27 whereas other studies do not find any such association.28 Similarly, certain mental disorders, especially those exhibiting active symptoms, such as psychoses, are related to restraint use in some studies but not in others. These findings are consistent with the results of controlled experiments, which reveal substantial disagreement among physicians about the causes and recommendations for the use of restraints.30 Among the more consistent findings is a fairly large "facility effect," in which certain facilities are considerably more or less likely to use restraints. This effect suggests that the observed variability can be par- MED. 480, 480, 483, 485 (1990) (finding that disruptive behavior, risk of falling, and cognitive impairment were related to restraint use).
27 E.g., Way & Banks, supra note 20, at 77-78. 28 See Fisher, supra note 12, at 1586 (" [A] ttempts to correlate demographics such as age, gender, and race are so contradictory that clear-cut trends rarely emerge."). (2000) (showing that nurses who apply restraints feel conflicted since they must choose between physically restraining patients and allowing them to potentially harm themselves or others). The results of these studies must be accepted cautiously however, as the methodology is highly susceptible to social desirability effects (i.e., providing the most socially desirable response). Interestingly, one study found that male staff members are more likely to believe restraint is a negative experience (for patients), whereas female staff members are more likely to believe restraints are a positive experience. While some advocates consider restraints to be a barbaric practice, those in charge of administering restraints deem them to be a necessary evil and unavoidable aspect of their profession. They argue that restraints provide safety for staff and patients, promote milieu on the ward, and calm belligerent patients.32 Although some would prefer to use seclusion over restraints, 33 overcrowding and a lack of resources (i.e., seclusion rooms) often preclude this option. There are also some instances in which no other alternative can effectively avert violence. It should be noted that the use of restraints as a punitive or deterrent device is explicitly prohibited. 34 higher rate of restraint use may not be surprising since certain facilities, because of referral policies, practices, resource availability, etc., tend to encounter more violent patients which might in turn necessitate a higher rate of restraint use. ("Frequently nonrestraint is achieved at the expense of patient selectivity; more violent patients may be sent to other-often state-hospitals."). To demonstrate a true "facility effect" it would be necessary to randomly assign patients to facilities and then compare the rate of restraint use, or at the very least, statistically control for the danger level presented by patients at each facility. nishes that hospital personnel must never use restraints for punitive purposes or staff convenience. Tardiff & Lion, supra note 1, at 352. There is some ambiguity, however, as to whether punishment is used in a "behavioral therapy" sense or in a punitive sense. See David Wexler, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT, in THE PSYCHIATRIC USES OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 122, 122 (Kenneth Tardiff ed., 1985) . Even in the former instance, in which restraints are used to modify behavior, they seem generally impermissible without informed consent. However, a central tenet of informed consent is that it is revocable at any time, so the feasibility of this justification seems limited. Id at 118. An additional end run is to claim that behavior modification is necessary to prevent dangerous or violent behavior. Thus, restraints for the purpose of behavior modification may be permissible if they reduce the likelihood of dangerous behavior. Id. at 120. But since arguably all forms of treatment are directly or indirectly geared toward reducing danger, this distinction is disingenuous.
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The necessary evil argument has not escaped criticism. Following the so-called "British experience,"35 a movement in the United Kingdom to eschew the use of restraints in psychiatric practice, restraints are almost never used, Zet the prevalence of violence is not greater in British psychiatric wards.3 Generalizability issues notwithstanding, 37 the data seem to indicate that restraints are not necessary to achieve their safety or milieu objectives.
38
These findings are consistent with a burgeoning literature in the United States on alternatives to restraints. For instance, one study found that a simple training program, in which clinicians experience restraints first hand, substantially reduced the use of restraints without a corresponding 39 increase in the occurrences of violence. Another study found that simply PSYCHIATRY 345, 345, 347 (2000) . Thus, the observed lack of violence following the eschewal of restraints could be an artifact stemming from the relative lack of violence to begin with. This argument is supported by empirical studies from western European countries. which limits the ability to make casual claims from the data. Furthermore, the studies likely suffer from "observer/expectancy effects," which might cause both staff and participants to behave differently given their awareness of the study.42 These effects are particularly likely to occur if a staff member developed the tested alternative, since she might have a vested interest in its success. 43 There are also reporting issues related to observer effects. Most of the studies compare rates of restraint use and violence occurrence rates, both of which are typically ascertained by official hospital records. But no study has examined whether the reporting habits are consistent following the implementation of the alternative approach. These methodological issues potentially limit the internal validity-that is, the ability to make causal statements about the efficacy of the restraint alternatives. None of the proposed alternatives have been subjected to randomized clinical trials, the gold standard for determining efficacy in the medical field.45 Hence, the empirical findings should be considered preliminary rather than definitive proof that restraints are superfluous. (1997), which found a reduction in the use of restraints and violence following the implementation of a campaign to implement less-restrictive measures. It could be the case, however, that staff members habitually overused restraints, but, following the campaign, were simply less apt to use restraints (for reasons unrelated to the specifics of the campaign). Hence, one would expect that restraints to be used less frequently without a corresponding increase in violence because restraints were previously used unnecessarily.
43 This is not necessarily chicanery. Many cognitive biases arise when looking to confirm a hypothesis. For example, confirmation bias is the tendency to seek evidence that is consistent with a hypothesis and discount evidence that is inconsistent with it. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175-211 (1998). Importantly, the confirmation bias typically occurs outside the realm of consciousness, hence it should not be interpreted as intentional deception. Id. at 202. NURSING 28, 33-34 (1995) . However, one should bear in mind that the expressed sole purpose of the use of restraints is to contain rather than modify behavior.
The debate over the propriety of the use of restraints has reached a stalemate. Advocates, relying on empirical evidence, claim that restraints are unnecessary, and professionals, pursuant to standard care, continue to use restraints. This Comment suggests that a satisfactory resolution might lie somewhere in between these poles. Very few advocates would argue that the use of restraints is never permissible. Instead, it seems that advocates argue that the de facto use of restraints is arbitrary, excessive, and ultimately abusive. Insofar as this argument is valid, this Comment suggests that the current state of affairs is not solely attributable to the professionals who use restraints in practice. The current situation is at least partially the result of the case law governing the use of restraints, which, as is discussed in the next section, grants considerable deference to professionals to make decisions regarding the use of restraints. The law only requires "danger" in order to use restraints. It does not articulate the requisite level or type of danger that would justify the use of restraints. As a result, there are no means by which to evaluate the decision to use restraints, nor any real accountability for restraint use. Delineating an acceptable threshold level of danger that legitimates the use of restraints would help overcome both these limitations. The purpose of this paper is to explore this threshold.
This paper proceeds in five sections. Part II describes the case law pertaining to the use of restraints, which is both circular and empty, and which motivates the formal analysis contained in this paper. Part III explains how the decision to use restraints is fundamentally a diagnostic decision. This decision, like any diagnostic decision, inherently turns on a tradeoff between two types of errors: false positives (i.e., applying restraints when not required) and false negatives (i.e., failing to apply restraints when required). This section presents the results of an empirical study that elicited judgments from two different groups of stakeholders, practicing clinicians and former psychiatric patients, regarding the appropriate tradeoff. Not surprisingly, the judgments were radically disparate, indicating that different stakeholders have very different beliefs about when the use of restraints is legitimate. Part IV considers the normative implications for the use of restraints. Because the judgments of both stakeholder groups are relevant but conflicting, a normative threshold ought to be an amalgamation of all views. This section describes how each Use of restraints to modify behavior is generally impermissible. See supra note 34.
stakeholder's tradeoff can be differentially weighted to yield a single, normative threshold for when the use of restraints is legitimate. Part V provides a substantive discussion of the findings and their practical implications for the law.
II. CASE LAW ON THE USE OF RESTRAINTS
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of the use of mechanical restraints in Youngberg v. Romeo. 4 7 The Youngberg Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment established liberty interests to reasonably safe conditions of confinement and freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints. 4 8 The Court noted that there are situations in which restraints are permissible, and stated that the relevant query is "not simply whether a liberty interest has been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due process." 4 9 The standard for evaluating the use of restraints requires only that professional judgment be exercised, 5 0 based on the rationale that the judiciary is not more qualified to make such decisions.
5 1 Thus, the Court appears to show great deference to "professionals" and their judgment. 52 Notably, the Court defined a professional as "a person competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue." 5 3 The Court explicitly left the responsibility with lower courts to de-
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
48 Id. at 323-25. 49 Id. at 320. so See id at 323 ("[setting forth a test that establishes liability when there is] such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.").
5 1 Id. at 321. 52 This deference substantially forecloses any liability claims that could be brought by patients for improper use of restraints. As the Court went on to state, "[T]he decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." Id. at 323. This reasoning is either tautological in that the decision is correct by virtue of the fact that a professional made it, or incoherent since the judgment made by a professional is necessarily a professional judgment. Statutes governing the use of restraints are quite similar among jurisdictions. Almost all jurisdictions approve the use of restraints, provided they are the "least restrictive alternative" that will adequately contain the danger. 55 Some statutes are more stringent in that restraints may be applied only after less restrictive alternatives have failed, 56 but the statutes do not specify which modalities are the "least" restrictive, and there is not consensus on this issue. or a mechanical restraint unless necessary because there is imminent physical danger to the patient or others and a physician so orders."5 There are, however, some slight variations in the statutes with regard to the temporal adjective describing the danger. Connecticut requires "imminent danger,,,59 Illinois requires "immediate danger,"60 and some statutes do not specify a temporal property at all, simply requiring "danger."61
Nearly all statutes are remarkably vague with respect to defining "danger," or the types of acts that would satisfy the statutory definition of danger. Connecticut, for example, only states that the danger must be a "physical" danger.62 Other, more elaborate definitions typically either beg the question or are largely circular. For instance, Louisiana statutorily defines danger as "clinically significant threats or attempts to commit suicide or to inflict serious harm to self, or a substantial risk or serious physical assault on another person, as evidenced by dangerous actions or clinically significant threats." 63 In sum, the Youngberg Court recognized that patients have a fundamental right to be free from restraint except under specific conditions, and, at the same time, the Court vested professionals with the authority to determine these conditions. The Youngberg logic is self-defeating for at least two reasons. The first stems from relegating this determination to professionals, who are clearly not disinterested. A restrain-first, ask-questionslater, better-safe-than-sorry philosophy is reasonable from the clinician's perspective because it can effectively avert violence. However, this policy will likely result in numerous individuals being gratuitously restrained, which will do little to ensure that the promulgated liberty interests are protected. The second problem is the Court's deferential posture toward the professionals. As currently formulated, professional judgment cannot be second-guessed, provided the judgment is within the realm of "standard professional care."64 Aside from the fact that the empirical research paints a confusing picture about what level of care is considered "standard,"65 the Youngberg reasoning is specious. The reasoning is akin to accepting that 2 + 2 = 50 simply because a mathematics professor made the assertion. While a math professor might be qualified to make such statements, it is fallacious to assume that qualifications are a proxy for validity.66 Compounding the issue are the nebulous statutes that govern the use of restraints. The statutes generally authorize the use of restraints to "prevent danger," but because any non-neonate presents some potential for danger, this requirement is empty.
One way to potentially improve the situation is to reify the concept of "danger" for the purposes of using restraints. As with civil commitment, the fundamental issue is determining the level of danger at which intervention is justified.67 This level, or threshold, should incorporate not only the professional's desire to prevent violence, but also the patient's liberty interests. A threshold that delineates the acceptable range of risk that justifies the use of restraints could remediate both shortcomings of Youngberg. First, a range of risk deemed to be "acceptable" would inherently incorporate patients' liberty interests. Second, a delineated range provides a normative standard to evaluate and enforce de facto restraint decisions. Thus, while the use of restraints will continue to be controversial, their application might be less capricious and presumably less deplorable if there were a standardized level of danger when the use of restraints is permissible. This section explicates the logic underlying decision theory. Decision theory is a method to formally balance costs and benefits in a decision dilemma. One relevant benefit of formalizing the decision dilemma is the transparency of the cost-benefit policy. Transparency permits an evaluation of whether the underlying policy is appropriate, which in turn indicates when the use of restraints is justified.
A. THE LOGIC
Decision theory was originally developed by applied mathematicians,68 but it has become a mainstay within contemporary economics69 and psycholog. 70 The theory relies on a set of axioms, known as coherence axioms, to derive an optimal decision, 72 given a set of preferences. 7o Psychology has become infused in contemporary economic thought, in a paradigm that is now called "behavioral economics." Psychologists who study judgment and decision-making have long used decision theory to evaluate the efficiency of decisions made under uncertainty. The seminal work was conducted by Ward Edwards, a psychologist who pioneered the judgment and decision making (behavioral decision theory) field. Ward Edwards, The Theory of Decision Making, 51 PSYCHOL. BULL. 380, 380, 410-11 (1954) .
The coherence axioms imply a type of internal consistency in choice. There are three axioms that follow from two general principles known as "weak ordering" and the "sure-thing principle." Weak ordering has two parts. The first is that choices must be "connected," such that X can be preferred to Y, or vice versa, or one can be indifferent between X and Y. If X cannot be compared to Y, then the connected axiom is violated. The second axiom of weak ordering is known as "transitivity." Transitivity holds that if X is preferred to Y and Y is preferred to Z, then X is preferred to Z. The sure-thing principle holds that if the outcome is the same no matter the choice, then the choice should not depend on the outcome. JON BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 233-36 (3d ed. 2000).
These preferences refer to the desirability of the costs and benefits associated with the possible outcomes of the decision. Importantly, the theory does not dictate what the preferences ought to be, which are determined by the decision-maker. Rather the theory states what the optimal choice should be given a specified set of preferences. The theory itself is not mathematically convoluted, but Figure 1 below can pictorially convey the crux of the logic. Accordingly, all equations will be relegated to footnotes.
Figure 1 depicts two different groups of patients: the group on the right represents violent patients; and the group on the left represents nonviolent patients. 73 The objective is to determine which patients are violent 72 The term "optimal" is for our purposes synonymous with the term "rational." Rationality concerns methods of thinking, not necessarily the conclusions that are generated or reached. Id. at 55. Hence, calling something "irrational" suggests a disagreement with the thinking process. Id Irrationality, taken to be the antithesis of rationality, in economics and psychology is generally defined as deviating from the axioms of expected utility (EU). Id For example, one might violate transitivity yet still reach the desired outcome. In psychology and economics this would be considered irrational behavior. and implement restraints on those patients only. However, since clinicians are neither omniscient nor possess perfect detection capabilities, there is overlap in the two groups, implying that some non-violent patients appear violent and some violent patients appear non-violent. Appearance refers to the perceived likelihood that a given patient will be violent.74 That is, a personal belief about the likelihood that a given patient will engage in violence.
The horizontal axis of Figure 1 reflects the perceived likelihood that a patient will engage in violence. For the most part, violent patients are perceived to be more likely to engage in violence than non-violent patients. But some violent patients actually appear to have a lower likelihood of violence than some non-violent patients. In short, the perceived likelihood that a patient will engage in violence is an imperfect indicator of whether a patient actually will engage in violence. It is, however, the best indicator that is available, so the decision inevitably boils down to avoiding certain errors.
Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 37-41 (1978)
. "Violence," as currently used will be left in the abstract, while fully acknowledging that a formal operational definition is required to give the term concrete meaning. Also, referring to patients as "violent" or "not violent" is not to suggest a sort of determinism about the autonomy of psychiatric patients. Violence is often highly situational or conditional. . However, it is much easier to refer to patients as either violent or not (given certain conditions and situations, etc.), and so this language will be used. 74 This likelihood refers to a personal perception held by the clinician. This conceptualization follows from the subjective interpretation of probability, which regards probability as a degree of belief in a proposition. SAVAGE, supra note 68, at 3. This form of probability is different than the frequentist conception of probability, according to which probability is based on observed frequencies in the long run. For example, the probability of a heads in a coin flip is 0.5 because in the long run one would expect to observe a heads half the time. Some events are unique, and therefore do not lend themselves to the frequentist conception of probability. The subjective interpretation is appropriate for unique events. See generally JOHN G. KEMENY, A PHILOSOPHER LOOKS AT SCIENCE 65-81 (1959) (discussing the various conceptions of probability). A subjective probability can be based on innumerable factors, including past experience, professional training, etc., and it may or may not be well calibrated, but that is not important for the application of decision theory. Subjective probabilities can span the unit interval of [0-1.0].
It is important to not conflate the term "likelihood" with the term "risk." Risk typically is considered the probability of an event weighted by the magnitude of its outcomes. "Likelihood" is meant to refer strictly to the likelihood of the event occurring (i.e., probability), without regard to the severity of its occurrence (i.e., magnitude).
Signal detection theory (SDT),76 which is subsumed under decision theory, is used to formally implement the preferred tradeoff between these errors. The two essential components of SDT are conveyed in Figure 1 . The first component is indicated by the degree of overlap between the two groups, which directly depends on the ability to discern violent patients from non-violent patients, a property referred to as "diagnosticity." All else being equal, greater diagnosticity results in less error because violent patients are more discernable from nonviolent patients.
The second component is the decision threshold "t*,"which is used to make binary decisions from continuous information. In this context, the threshold indicates the point at which the perceived likelihood of violence is sufficient to warrant the use of restraints. Patients with a perceived likelihood above this threshold are restrained and patients below this threshold are not restrained. Again, since some non-violent patients appear violent and some violent patients appear non-violent, the binary decision to use restraints fundamentally turns on a tradeoff between restraining nonviolent patients and failing to restrain violent patients, or false positives 76 SDT was originally developed in the context of psychophysics, but it has been successfully applied in a variety of contexts such as weather forecasting, medical decision-making, oil exploration, quality control, aviation failure testing, and the law. CLYDE COOMBS ET AL., nA common numeric metric to describe the degree of overlap is d', the standardized difference between the means of the respective groups. John A. Swets, Indices of Discrimination on Diagnostic Accuracy: Their ROCs and Implied Models, 99 PSYCHOL. BULL. 100, 102 (1986). Formally, this measure indicates the sensitivity of the discriminate ability. Sensitivity is the true positive rate (i.e., the probability of correctly detecting violence, given the person is violent), which can be used to construct a receiver operation characteristic curve (ROC). An ROC is a superior metric of accuracy because it is independent of the base rate and the decision criterion. For reviews, see John A. 78 The acceptable tradeoff is determined by the consequences, or in decision parlance the "utility" 79 associated with each outcome. If false positives are more costly than false negatives, the threshold should be adjusted right to decrease the occurrence of this error type. Conversely, if false negatives are more costly, the threshold should be adjusted left to decrease the occurrence. Decision theory specifies the threshold value that achieves the decision-maker's preferred balance of 80 error.
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN ELEMENTARY INTRODUCTION
There is an additional component that is not readily apparent in Figure 1. The prevalence, or "base rate," 8 1 of violence in the patient population also influences the frequency of errors.82 When an event is rare, overPositive or negative refers to whether or not restraints are applied, respectively. True or false refers to whether this is accurate with respect to the true state of affairs.
7 Utility is a concept used to compare abstract and seemingly incommensurable things. For example, comparing X dollars to Y dollars is simple, but comparing X dollars to the value of love is not straightforward. Utility captures the holistic value of intangible things such as love, virtue, and respect and allows the relative importance of these attributes to be compared to other things. See BARON, supra note 71, at 223-24.
Io It is important to acknowledge that the values of the correct decisions (i.e., true positives and true negatives) are relevant to the decision task. Many juridical decision-analyses assume that the desirability of the true outcomes is equally desirable and exclusively focus on the tradeoff of the errors. This is the signal detection equation:
8 To demonstrate the impact of base rates, consider the following example. Suppose a test can detect cancer with 99% accuracy. Suppose this test is administered to a population in which 1 person in 1,000 has cancer. Given a person tests positive for cancer, what is the probability that the person actually has cancer? The answer is not 99%. Since the test errors 1% of the time, 1% of the population, or 10 people, who do not have cancer will test positive. Assuming the one person with cancer was actually detected, the probability of actually having cancer, given a positive test result, is I in II or about 9%. Now suppose the same test is applied to a population in which 500 out of 1,000 people actually have cancer. The test still errors 1% of the time, identifying 5 cancer-free people as having cancer, and, since it is 99% accurate, it identifies 495 of the 500 who do have cancer. Given a positive test result, then, the probability the person actually has cancer is 495/500, or greater than 99%. See Eric S. In Figure 2a ., violence is relatively rare; the distribution of nonviolent patients is twice the size of the distribution of violent patients. The opposite is true for Figure 2b ., in which the distribution of violent patients is twice the size of the distribution of non-violent patients. Notice that the proportion of false positives (the proportion of non-violent patients to the right of t*) is considerably greater in 2a. than in 2b., and that the proportion of false negatives (the proportion of violent patients to the left of t*) is greater in 2b. than in 2a. This is because the base rate influences the relative proportion of a given error. The threshold must be adjusted to compensate for the base rate in order to produce the desired frequency of errors (assuming diagnosticity is fixed).
B. THE INGREDIENTS
Decision theory holds that the decision problem is comprised of three REVIEW OF LA WAND SOCIAL JUSTICE [Vol. 21:1 components, but the theory does not specify what the components are. Probabilities and utilities are not self-defining. This section is concerned with specifying the components. The first subsection addresses the utility issue. We interviewed different stakeholder groups about the use of mechanical restraints, and solicited value judgments about the relative preferability of the various outcomes. The data bearing on the tradeoffs are described. The values pertaining to the other two components-diagnosticity and base rates-are approximated from extant empirical research. Finally, we use these approximations in conjunction with the elicited utility functions to converge on the threshold for restraint use.
Methods
A total of thirty-two participants85 were solicited from two separate stakeholder groups: (1) former mental patients; and (2) psychiatrists (hereinafter "doctors").
86 Of these, twenty-two participants responded to a questionnaire about their experiences with restraints, which probed their personal thoughts and feelings, emphasizing that there is no right or wrong answer. The questionnaire elicited a "preferred marginal tradeoff," defined as "the number of treatment errors that are acceptable in order to treat correctly one additional person with the disease." This is akin to eliciting a 8 This was a convenience sample procured through associates of the Saks Institute for Mental Health Law, Policy, and Ethics at the USC Gould School of Law. Approval from the USC Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct this research was granted to Nicholas Scurich, An Empirical Study of The Use of Mechanical Restraints in Psychiatric Practice (Spring, 2011) (questionnaire and data on file with author).
86 A few of the doctors pointed out that psychiatric nurses, not doctors, are typically responsible for ordering the use of restraints. Legally, a person from either of these groups is able to order restraints. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30 (1982). Pursuant to some guidelines, the doctor must formally approve the order within a certain time frame. 42 C.F.R. § 482.1 3(e)(7) (2011). The reported findings cannot be generalized beyond doctors (psychiatrists) because data were not collected from forensic nurses. There is, however, no reason to believe that psychiatric nurses would have a systematically different perspective than doctors with respect to the use of mechanical restraints.
Blackstone-type ratio regarding the appropriate tradeoff of errors.89 However, whereas Blackstone held that a false conviction (false positive) is considerably less desirable than a false acquittal (false negative), the current study did not make such a presupposition. Instead, participants were first asked which of the two errors they considered to be worse, and then, depending on their response, were asked how many errors they would tolerate at the expense of just one of the less desirable errors. This approach isolates the utility aspect from other considerations, such as the base rate or diagnosticity. 
Preferred Marginal Tradeoffs
Former mental health patients responded unanimously that false positives are worse than false negatives. The median patient tradeoff indicated that 141 false negatives were equivalent to one false positive (geometric mean: 86 false negatives equivalent to 1 false positive).92 In contrast, the majority of doctors indicated that false negatives were worse than false positives. The median response from doctors indicated that seven false positives were equivalent to one false negative (geometric mean: 4.5 false positives equivalent to 1 false negative.) 
(1992) (describing the same approach).
91 DeNeef & Kent, supra note 88, at 126. 92 Id The geometric mean, defined as the nth root of the product of all observations, is useful when the quantity is a ratio. Ratio data are "centered" around 1.0, with ratios less than 1 compressed into the interval (0,1) and ratios greater than I spread over the range (1,0o). This creates a problem for arithmetic means, which give more weight to ratios greater than I than those less than 1. For example, 2 observations that are inverses, 10.0 and 0.10, would yield an arithmetic mean of 5.05, but a geometric mean of 1.0 [=((10.0)(0.10)) 1/2]]. While arithmetic means give greater weight to ratios greater than 1.0, geometric means weigh k and 1/k equally. Note that the geometric mean is equivalent to the exponential of the arithmetic average of the natural logs of the ratios.
Diagnosticity
Ascertaining diagnosticity would require controlled experimentation, an endeavor that is potentially quite costly and practically difficult to undertake. Fortuitously, studies on the clinical ability to predict violence are voluminous. 93 Although these studies were not concerned with the use of restraints per se, they do provide a rough estimate of the clinical ability to forecast violence. 94 The best meta-analysis 95 of the clinical ability to fore- 94 We are unaware of any empirical evidence that examines the accuracy with which professionals are able to discern violent patients for the sole purpose of using mechanical restraints. The extant literature on violence prediction examines the ability of clinicians to predict which patients will be violent when released into the community, generally without supervision. Admittedly, these are two different tasks, but there is no reason to believe that the ability level would differ dramatically. 
Base Rates
Research finds that the base rate of violence on psychiatric wards varies dramatically. Much of this variability is attributable to inter-study differences in the operational definitions of violence, the length of the study, and the method used to determine whether violence occurred. A lack of standardization in restraint use may also contribute to inter-study variability. For example, highly risk adverse staff would be more likely to use preventative interventions, which presumably lower the base rate by thwarting violence. Other staff may be more concerned with patients' liberty interests and thus more reluctant to engage in preventative intervention, which could result in an increase in the base rate of violence.
Regardless of definitional issues and inter-study variability, the base rate of violence on psychiatric wards appears to be low. In general, a small minority of psychiatric inpatients will engage in violence. 10 0 Certain patients tend to be repeat offenders in that a small number of individuals tend to commit the majority of violence. 10 1 In order to meaningfully com- The tradeoffs elicited from the various stakeholders are now translated into a threshold value. According to doctors, one false negative is equivalent to about seven false positives (4.5 using geometric mean), suggesting that restraints should be used whenever the likelihood of violence is above about 0.15 (0.18 using geometric mean). On the other hand, former mental patients believe that about 141 false negatives are equivalent to I false positive (86 using geometric mean), implying that the likelihood of violence needs to be in excess of 0.99 (0.98 using geometric mean) in order to use restraints.
To illustrate the magnitude of these risk levels, consider that the chance of a heads in a (fair) coin toss is 0.50. Hence doctors require a probability of violence considerably lower than landing heads in a coin toss in order to implement restraints, whereas patients would require that the chance of violence be much greater. The coin flip analogy is not entirely apt here, because the likelihood of violence estimates refer to subjectively perceived probabilities, not frequency estimates (i.e., a heads occurs 50% of the time in the long run). Still, the likelihood of violence estimates can be likened to the certainty required before one would take a bet that the proposition is true.104 In other words, a doctor would be indifferent betients accounted for 75% of all violence. ' BARON, supra note 71, at 102 (noting that probability can be understood as a personal willingness to bet that a proposition is true).
tween the betting that the use of restraints is appropriate and taking a gamble where the chances of success are 0.15, whereas the patient would not take the gamble unless the chances of success are greater than 0.99. Of course 0.99 is close to near certainty.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
The value judgments about the error tradeoffs were radically disparate. In fact, the doctors and patients did not even agree about which error was less desirable. This underpins the dramatic difference in opinion between the doctors and patients about when the use of restraints is justified, and naturally leads to the question: whose tradeoff judgment ought to be used? The Youngberg decision provides a beginning point to address this question. Recall Youngberg held that the standard for evaluating the use of restraints is whether adequate professional judgment was exercised. But the Court also held that patients have a liberty interest to be free from restraints except under certain conditions. Although professionals are in charge of determining these conditions, the Court clearly held that patients have a legitimate interest in the decision to use mechanical restraints. Thus, at a minimum, Youngberg can be taken to hold that no one stakeholder's policy dominates, and that the interests of both are relevant to the decision-making calculus.
Assuming both stakeholders ought to be included in a normative policy, the issue becomes determining the amount of weight to ascribe to each perspective. It seems unlikely that the weights are equipoise for both stakeholder groups. Table 1 below indicates some possible weighting schemes for the tradeoffs of the two groups. The two left-most columns indicate the weights for the relevant stakeholder; the center two columns indicate how this weighting scheme would affect the tradeoff ratio (false negatives relative to false positives); and the right-most column indicates what effect this would have on the threshold, expressed in probabilistic terms. At one extreme, the doctor's perspective is weighted quite heavily (9:1), and tradeoff ratio is less than 1, with a corresponding threshold probability of less than 0.30. When doctors are weighted just a little over twice patients (7:3), the tradeoff ratio is only slightly greater than one, with a corresponding threshold probability of slightly over 0.50. With equal weights for the two stakeholder groups, the tradeoff is over 4, with corresponding threshold probabilities greater than 0.80. When patients are weighted higher than doctors, the tradeoff ratios climb higher, and the threshold probabilities exceed 0.95.
V. DISCUSSION
The Court's posture in Youngberg is clear: the Court places more faith in the doctor's decision to use restraints than in judicial secondguessing. This holding, in conjunction with the nebulous requirement of "danger," has made it nearly impossible to evaluate the appropriateness of the decision to use mechanical restraints. The analytical framework utilized in this paper, however, provides a means for evaluation by enabling one to discern when the use of restraint is legitimate or illegitimate by considering whether the requisite level of danger was apparent. Thus, aside from the empirical findings, this paper provides a framework to reify the unhelpful case law and empty statutory language pertaining to the use of mechanical restraints.
The disparate tradeoffs are perhaps the most interesting aspect of this paper. One should bear in mind that the reported tradeoffs are based on aggregate data. Some of the responses were even more extreme than the summary statistics (i.e., median; geometric mean) indicate. For example, one doctor indicated that she would tolerate an infinite number of false positives to avoid just one false negative and stated, "There is [sic] never too many false positives."' 0 5 Responses from some of the patients could not be more diametric, as one patient lamented, "The effect of being restrained has never left me. The trauma has led to a PTSD diagnosis.... There has to be another way [to do things]. There has to be."
This patient indicated that 1,000 false negatives are equivalent in cost to just one false positive.
Several explanations for these disparities are possible. One is a type of self-serving bias, since patients bear many or all of the costs associated with restraints while doctors are mostly the beneficiary. There could also be divergent perceptions about restraints and their consequences. For example, suffering and abuse might quickly come to mind when patients think about restraints, but doctors may think of instances when restraints were successful or when they believe restraints saved them from harm or injury.1 07 The disparity could also result from an empathy gap on the doctor's behalf. None of the doctors in this study had experienced restraints first-hand. Given that staff members who experience restraints firsthand 108 are much less likely to apply restraints to others, it is plausible that doctors would have a different tradeoff after being placed in mechanical restraints themselves. It would be interesting to examine whether a doctor's tradeoff changes after experiencing restraints firsthand.
The tradeoffs reported in this paper and the corresponding thresholds 1os Scurich, supra note 85. 107 Id. (statement of surveyed doctor) ("I've seen and heard of too many people being attacked to have a more liberal approach. I believe in restraints for the safety of the staff, other patients, and the patients acting out themselves.").
08 See Forster et al., supra note 39, at 270.
depend on the specific type of restraint used. In the survey, restraints were described as full-body restraints. More or less intrusive forms of restraints would invoke a different set of consequences. It is axiomatic in decision theory that decisions are a function of their potential consequences, so it would be rational for different forms of restraints to have different thresholds that justify their use. As a general heuristic, if the potential consequences are less serious, the necessary level of risk to justify the use of restraints would decrease. As the potential consequences become increasingly dire, the level of potential risk required to use restraints would increase. The endeavor to create and apply a universal threshold is seemingly inconsistent with certain jurisprudential ideals, such as the notion of "individualized justice"; that is, the treatment of people as individuals, rather than as members of a statistical group, who are either above or below an apriori threshold level of risk. 109 Regardless of whether this is true, making case-by-case determinations is highly unlikely to yield a tradeoff that is consistent normative policy. Indeed, case-by-case determinations are largely capricious and idiosyncratic. 110 The decision to use restraints should include pertinent information about the individual, but it should also be congruent with normative policy. Under the current approach, information about the specific individual is relevant to the perceived likelihood of violence; whether or not this likelihood is sufficient to justify the use of restraints is an issue that depends on the normative value tradeoff. Thus, individual considerations are still relevant to and included in the decision.
It might be argued that the metric utilized in this paper is cryptic and 1996) . There is a phenomena known as "broken leg countervailings" which is typically invoked to override empirically established decision rules. Roughly, the idea is that a formula might do quite well at making predictions, but there could be an anomaly not accounted for in the formula that would render the formulaic prediction spurious. Although broken leg countervailings are theoretically possible, there are no concrete examples of their existence, and, moreover, people would not be proficient at detecting them.
not very practical. It is true that doctors would probably not attempt to quantify their estimate of the likelihood that the patient will engage in violence. Practicing physicians probably think in crude, non-numeric terms, describing the likelihood of violence as "likely" or "very likely." Moreover, the judiciary would have a difficult time second-guessing the doctor's assessment, especially since the judiciary is not present during the situation. These are valid criticisms, but they are not devastating to the paper's enterprise. The analysis contained in this paper is normative-indicating how these decisions ought to be made. The fact that decision-makers do not live up to these ideals does not mean the ideals are invalid. Instead, research could be undertaken to help decision-makers come closer to meeting the mark. One potential avenue for improvement is by using actuarial (statistical) or "structured professional judgment" to assess the likelihood of violence. Such approaches are not intensely onerous, and greatly improve the reliability of diagnostic decisions.112 It is plausible that some form of structured professional judgment could be adapted to be used for the purposes of administering restraints. Perhaps doctors could receive training to help calibrate their risk assessments and transcend the use of crude, non-numeric terms, which have been shown to have no consensus within the psychiatric field." 3 1I1 See Monahan, supra note 93, at 20-27 (discussing structured approaches to assess violence risk). Structured Professional Judgment does not follow a rigid algorithm, but instead identifies the relevant risk variables and permits the clinician to intuitively amalgamate them into a risk estimate. Jennifer L. 
